

The Darker Sides of Assembly

We've seen it.

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Moments in History



Thompson's Compiler Backdoor
<http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html>

“I am a programmer. On my 1040 form, that is what I put down as my occupation. As a programmer, I write programs. I would like to present to you the **cute_{st}** program I ever wrote. I will do this in three stages and try to bring it together at the end.”

This Script Kitty is more cute, right?



<http://www.b3tards.com/v/1f879bbd15d3273880f9/1108.jpg>

Moments in History

On November 2, 1988, Robert Morris, Jr., a graduate student in Computer Science at Cornell, wrote an experimental, self-replicating, self-propagating program called a worm and injected it into the Internet. He chose to release it from MIT, to disguise the fact that the worm came from Cornell

<http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/morris-worm.html>

gets() payload in fingerd

Shellcode spotlight →
Robert Morris, Jr. worm
(Spaf)

```
pushl    $68732f      '/sh\0'  
pushl    $6e69622f    '/bin'  
movl     sp, r10  
pushl    $0  
pushl    $0  
pushl    r10  
pushl    $3  
movl     sp, ap  
chmk     $3b
```



<http://scrapetv.com/News/News%20Pages/Science/Images/dune-sandworm.jpg>

Spaf does it right

- Best analysis ever on The Morris Worm:
<http://homes.cerias.purdue.edu/~spaf/tech-reps/82>

- 8) The infection attempts proceeded by one of three routes: *rsh*, *fingerd*, or *sendmail*.
- 8a) The attack via *rsh* was done by attempting to spawn a remote shell by invocation of (in order of trial) */usr/ucb/rsh*, */usr/bin/rsh*, and */bin/rsh*. If successful, the host was infected as in steps 1 and 2a, above.
- 8b) The attack via the *finger* daemon was somewhat more subtle. A connection was established to the remote *finger* server daemon and then a specially constructed string of 536 bytes was passed to the daemon, overflowing its input buffer and overwriting parts of the stack. For standard 4 BSD versions running on VAX computers, the overflow resulted in the return stack frame for the *main* routine being changed so that the return address pointed into the buffer on the stack. The instructions that were written into the stack at that location were:

```
pushl    $68732f      '/sh\0'
pushl    $6e69622f    '/bin'
movl     sp, r10
pushl    $0
pushl    $0
pushl    r10
pushl    $3
movl     sp, ap
chmk     $3b
```

That is, the code executed when the *main* routine attempted to return was:

```
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0)
```

On VAXen, this resulted in the worm connected to a remote shell via the TCP connection. The worm then proceeded to infect the host as in steps 1 and 2a, above. On Suns, this simply resulted in a core file since the code was not in place to corrupt a Sun version of *fingerd* in a similar fashion.

- 8c) The worm then tried to infect the remote host by establishing a connection to the SMTP port and mailing an infection, as in step 2b, above.

Outline of Today's Agenda

- Moments in History
- Basic terminology
- Code injection
 - Shellcode
 - Building a virus
 - The ELF format
 - Injection Schemes
 - ? Surprise us

Terminology

- Backdoor —————> • Program allowing remote, covert access
- Virus —————> • Parasitic program
- Worm —————> • Self-propagating network-enabled program
- Rootkit —————> • Tools to covertly maintain high-level system access
- Malware/Spyware —————> • Harmful software (popups, password/CC sniffers....)
- Botnet —————> • MMORPG – without the RPG



<http://www.flickr.com/photos/andresrueda/2983149263/>

Code injection we care about

- Runtime Arbitrary Code Execution
 - Privileged Processes
 - Signed/Trusted Code Execution Environments
 - Remote programs
- Program File injection
- ???

Runtime Code Injection

- Remember all those crashmes?
- Local code injection
 - Command line arguments, environment, pathname, executable interpreter flags, program data (heap,stack,...)
- Remote code injection
 - Program data

Writing your first shellcode.

- Goal:
 - do not fork bomb anything
 - Print a message to the screen

asm

BITS 32

```
; nasm -f elf code.asm; ld -o code.bin code.o; ./code.bin  
; nasm -f bin code.asm ; ndisasm -u ./code
```

global _start

_start:

xor eax, eax

mov eax, 4

jmp data

back:

xor ebx, ebx

pop ecx

mov edx, 13

int 0x80

mov eax, 1

int 0x80

data:

call back

db "HI csci4971",0x0a

demO

Minimization tips

- Data is code is data is code is data is code ...
(von Neumann arch vs Harvard)
- NUL byte safe?
 - Match constants to register sizes
 - Avoid some instructions
 - Use math to get values with NUL
 - Encoder/Decoder

Minimization Tips (II)

- Size problems?
 - Multi-staged payloads
 - Establish data transfer
 - Receive code
 - Decode it
 - Execute it
- Code crunch:
 - extra credz for shortest, self-contained d/l and execute binary code.

No shellcode necessary


- Ret2libc
 - Solar Designer '97
 - ...

Memory corruption can be hard, but also very easy

- Linux local bugs:
- Off-by-one on gcc4 main()
 - Truncates frame pointer by one byte
- Bypass ASLR
 - “patched up”
 - Still missing /proc/pid/stat

Writing a Virus

- Parasitic code
 - Injects into drivers, system code files, executable programs, runtime process memory, ...



Plan of Action

- Harmless Linux ELF Infector
 - Open a file
 - Expand size
 - Inject code
 - Update offsets
 - Save to filesystem

Useful links

- Cesare's <http://vx.netlux.org/lib/static/vdat/tuunix02.htm>
- Eresi: <http://www.eresi-project.org/>
- http://virus.bartolich.at/virus-writing-HOWTO/_html/index.html
- <http://felinemenace.org/~mercy/slides/RUXCON2004-ELFfairytale.ppt>
- <http://www.vx.netlux.org/lib/vrn00.html>
- <http://www.phrack.com/issues.html?issue=56&id=7&mode=txt>
- ...

The ELF Format

- ELF Header
 - Man 5 elf
- Program Headers
 - Runtime
- Section Headers
 - Link time
- Misc

More useful links

- <http://www.sco.com/developers/gabi/latest/contents.html>
<http://www.sco.com/developers/devspecs/abi386-4.pdf>

Linking View

ELF header
Program header table (optional)
section 1
...
section n
...
...
Section header table

Execution View

ELF header
Program header table
Segment 1
Segment 2
...
...
Section header table (optional)

<http://users.csc.calpoly.edu/~mhaungs/paper/img7.gif>

ELF Header

```
typedef struct {  
    unsigned char e_ident[EI_NIDENT];  
    uint16_t      e_type;  
    uint16_t      e_machine;  
    uint32_t      e_version;  
    ElfN_Addr     e_entry;  
    ElfN_Off      e_phoff;  
    ElfN_Off      e_shoff;  
    uint32_t      e_flags;  
    uint16_t      e_ehsize;  
    uint16_t      e_phentsize;  
    uint16_t      e_phnum;  
    uint16_t      e_shentsize;  
    uint16_t      e_shnum;  
    uint16_t      e_shstrndx;  
} ElfN_Ehdr;
```



Program Headers

```
typedef struct {  
    uint32_t  p_type;  
    Elf32_Off p_offset;  
    Elf32_Addr p_vaddr;  
    Elf32_Addr p_paddr;  
    uint32_t  p_filesz;  
    uint32_t  p_memsz;  
    uint32_t  p_flags;  
    uint32_t  p_align;  
} Elf32_Phdr;
```

PT_LOAD


PT_INTERP

PF_X An executable segment.

PF_W A writable segment.

PF_R A readable segment.

Using readelf/objdump/etc



- Demo

Some ELF File Infection strategies

- Overwrite existing code
 - Semantic nop injector (bukowski framework)
- Hijack GOT/PLT redirection
- Expand TEXT segment
- Insert new PF_X segment
- Replace Dynamic Interpreter
- Inject malicious shared object file paths

Simple infector

- >>

PHDR Injection

- Add a PF_X segment
- Add code
- Hijack entry point / branch

How do you do it all in asm?

- Need self propagation
- No compiler available (Sorry Ken)

All you need is...

- `Open()`
- `Mmap()`
- `asm code`

Infector demo

ELF Virus Detection

- Tripwire...
- Mismatched Section Headers
- Extra executable segments
- Strange shared libraries/dynamic interpreter
- Unusual entry point
 - Q: Can the entry point be outside of the TEXT segment?
- Linux AVs
- ???