Competition in Mediated-Search based Markets
Dr. David Sarne
March 23rd, 2010
Sage 3303, 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Refreshments at 3:30 p.m.
The talk considers future electronic markets, where price
comparison is facilitated by self-interested comparison shopping agents. The
comparative search conducted by the agents is driven by incentives offered
by sellers, the cost incurred by the search, and competition dynamics that
arise in the multi-agent setting. Based on models of economic search theory
(and in particular "Pandora's problem", a formal analysis of the strategies
used by the agents and the corresponding expected buyers' expense and
sellers' net revenue are introduced. Equilibrium analysis is given for
homogeneous environments in which all agents share the same search
characteristics. Using this latter environment, it is demonstrated how the
transition to competitive comparison-shopping mediated market can in some
cases result both with lower expected expense to buyers and higher expected
net revenue to sellers.
David Sarne is an Assistant Professor at the Computer Science
Department at Bar-Ilan University. He holds a B.Sc. degree in Industrial
Engineering and M.Sc. degree in Information Systems both from Tel-Aviv
University and a Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from Bar-Ilan University.
He was a Postdoctoral Associate in SEAS at Harvard University.
Last updated: March 9, 2010