

# Computational social choice

## Statistical approaches

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
Sep 26, 2013

# Last class: manipulation

- Various “undesirable” behavior
  - manipulation
  - bribery
  - control



# Example: Crowdsourcing



$a > b$

Turker 1

$b > a$


Turker 2

...

$b > c$

Turker  $n$

# Outline: statistical approaches




# The Condorcet Jury theorem [Condorcet 1785]

## The Condorcet Jury theorem.

- Given
  - two alternatives  $\{a,b\}$ .
  - $0.5 < p < 1$ ,
- Suppose
  - each agent's preferences is generated i.i.d., such that
  - w/p  $p$ , the same as the ground truth
  - w/p  $1-p$ , different from the ground truth
- Then, as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , the majority of agents' preferences converges in probability to the ground truth

# Condorcet's MLE approach


- **Parametric ranking model**  $\mathcal{M}_r$ : given a “ground truth” parameter  $\Theta$ 
  - each vote  $P$  is drawn i.i.d. conditioned on  $\Theta$ , according to  $\Pr(P|\Theta)$



- Each  $P$  is a **ranking**
- For any profile  $D=(P_1, \dots, P_n)$ ,
  - The **likelihood** of  $\Theta$  is  $L(\Theta|D)=\Pr(D|\Theta)=\prod_{P \in D} \Pr(P|\Theta)$
  - **The MLE mechanism**
$$\text{MLE}(D)=\text{argmax}_{\Theta} L(\Theta|D)$$
  - Break ties randomly

# Condorcet's model [Condorcet 1785]

- Parameterized by a **ranking**
- Given a “ground truth” ranking  $W$  and  $p > 1/2$ , generate each pairwise comparison in  $V$  independently as follows (suppose  $c > d$  in  $W$ )




$$\Pr( b > c > a \mid a > b > c ) = ? (1-p)^2$$

The equation shows the probability of observing a ranking  $b > c > a$  given the ground truth ranking  $a > b > c$ . The probability is indicated as  $(1-p)^2$ , with a green question mark next to the  $(1-p)$  term.



- MLE ranking is the Kemeny rule [Young JEP-95]

# Outline: statistical approaches



# Statistical decision framework

Given  $\mathcal{M}_r$




# Example: Kemeny

$\mathcal{M}_r =$  Condorcet' model

Step 1: MLE

Step 2: top-alternative



# Frequentist vs. Bayesian in general

- You have a biased coin: head w/p  $p$ 
  - You observe 10 heads, 4 tails
  - Do you think the next two tosses will be two heads in a row?

Credit: Panos Ipeirotis  
& Roy Radner

## • Frequentist

- there is an unknown but **fixed** ground truth
- $p = 10/14 = 0.714$
- $\Pr(2\text{heads} | p = 0.714) = (0.714)^2 = 0.51 > 0.5$
- **Yes!**


## • Bayesian

- the ground truth is captured by a **belief distribution**
- Compute  $\Pr(p | \text{Data})$  assuming uniform prior
- Compute  $\Pr(2\text{heads} | \text{Data}) = 0.485 < 0.5$
- **No!**

# Kemeny = Frequentist approach

$\mathcal{M}_r$  = Condorcet' model


This is the Kemeny rule  
(for single winner)!



# Example: Bayesian

$\mathcal{M}_r = \text{Condorcet}' \text{ model}$

This is a new rule!




# Frequentist vs. Bayesian

	Anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity	Consistency	Condorcet	Easy to compute
Frequentist (Kemeny)	Y	N	Y	N
Bayesian			N	Y

Lots of open questions! Writing up a paper for submission

# Outline: statistical approaches



# Classical voting rules as MLEs

[Conitzer&Sandholm UAI-05]

- When the outcomes are winning **alternatives**
  - MLE rules must satisfy consistency: if  $r(D_1) \cap r(D_2) \neq \phi$ , then  $r(D_1 \cup D_2) = r(D_1) \cap r(D_2)$
  - All classical voting rules except positional scoring rules are NOT MLEs
- Positional scoring rules are MLEs
- This is NOT a coincidence!
  - All MLE rules that outputs winners satisfy anonymity and consistency
  - Positional scoring rules are the only voting rules that satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and consistency! [Young SIAMAM-75]

# Classical voting rules as MLEs

[Conitzer&Sandholm UAI-05]


- When the outcomes are winning **rankings**
  - MLE rules must satisfy **reinforcement** (the counterpart of consistency for rankings)
  - All classical voting rules except positional scoring rules and Kemeny are NOT MLEs
- This is not (completely) a coincidence!
  - Kemeny is the only **preference function** (that outputs rankings) that satisfies neutrality, reinforcement, and Condorcet consistency  
[Young&Levenglick SIAMAM-78]

# Are we happy?

- Condorcet's model
  - not very natural
  - computationally hard
- Other classic voting rules
  - most are not MLEs
  - models are not very natural either
  - approximately compute the MLE




# New mechanisms via the statistical decision framework




## Model selection

- How can we evaluate fitness?




## Frequentist or Bayesian?

- Focus on frequentist




## Computation

- How can we compute MLE efficiently?




# Outline: statistical approaches



# Random utility model (RUM)


## [Thurstone 27]

- Continuous parameters:  $\Theta = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_m)$ 
  - $m$ : number of alternatives
  - Each alternative is modeled by a **utility distribution**  $\mu_i$
  - $\theta_i$ : a vector that parameterizes  $\mu_i$
- An agent's **perceived utility**  $U_i$  for alternative  $c_i$  is generated independently according to  $\mu_i(U_i)$
- Agents rank alternatives according to their **perceived utilities**
  - $\Pr(c_2 > c_1 > c_3 | \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3) = \Pr_{U_i \sim \mu_i}(U_2 > U_1 > U_3)$



# Generating a preference-profile

- $\Pr(\text{Data} \mid \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3) = \prod_{R \in \text{Data}} \Pr(R \mid \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)$



# RUMs with Gumbel distributions



- $\mu_i$ 's are Gumbel distributions
  - A.k.a. the **Plackett-Luce (P-L) model** [BM 60, Yellott 77]
- Equivalently, there exist positive numbers  $\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_m$

$$\Pr(c_1 \succ c_2 \succ \dots \succ c_m \mid \lambda_1 \dots \lambda_m) = \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \dots + \lambda_m} \times \frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_2 + \dots + \lambda_m} \times \dots \times \frac{\lambda_{m-1}}{\lambda_{m-1} + \lambda_m}$$

$c_1$  is the top preference in  $\{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$



Pros:


- Computationally tractable
  - Analytical solution to the likelihood function
    - The only RUM that was known to be tractable
  - Widely applied in Economics [McFadden 74], learning to rank [Liu 11], and analyzing elections [GM 06,07,08,09]



Cons: does not seem to fit very well

# RUM with normal distributions

- $\mu_i$ 's are normal distributions
  - Thurstone's Case V [Thurstone 27]



😊 Pros:

- Intuitive
- Flexible

😞 Cons: believed to be computationally intractable

- No analytical solution for the likelihood function  $\Pr(P | \Theta)$  is known

$$\Pr(c_1 \succ \dots \succ c_m | \Theta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{U_m}^{\infty} \dots \int_{U_2}^{\infty} \mu_m(U_m) \mu_{m-1}(U_{m-1}) \dots \mu_1(U_1) dU_1 \dots dU_{m-1} dU_m$$

$U_m$ : from  $-\infty$  to  $\infty$

$U_{m-1}$ : from  $U_m$  to  $\infty$

...

$U_1$ : from  $U_2$  to  $\infty$

# MC-EM algorithm for RUMs

## [APX NIPS-12]

- Utility distributions  $\mu_l$ 's belong to the **exponential family (EF)**
  - Includes normal, Gamma, exponential, Binomial, Gumbel, etc.

- In each iteration  $t$

- E-step, for any set of parameters  $\Theta$

- Computes the expected log likelihood (*ELL*)

$$ELL(\Theta | \text{Data}, \Theta^t) = f(\Theta, g(\text{Data}, \Theta^t))$$


Approximately computed by Gibbs sampling

- M-step

- Choose  $\Theta^{t+1} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\Theta} ELL(\Theta | \text{Data}, \Theta^t)$

- Until  $|\Pr(D|\Theta^t) - \Pr(D|\Theta^{t+1})| < \varepsilon$

# Outline: statistical approaches



# Model selection

- Compare RUMs with Normal distributions and PL for
  - **log-likelihood**:  $\log \Pr(D|\Theta)$
  - **predictive log-likelihood**:  $E \log \Pr(D_{\text{test}}|\Theta)$
  - **Akaike information criterion** (AIC):  $2k-2\log \Pr(D|\Theta)$
  - **Bayesian information criterion** (BIC):  $k\log n-2\log \Pr(D|\Theta)$
- Tested on an election dataset
  - 9 alternatives, randomly chosen 50 voters

Value(Normal)	LL	Pred. LL	AIC	BIC
- Value(PL)	<b>44.8(15.8)</b>	<b>87.4(30.5)</b>	<b>-79.6(31.6)</b>	-50.5(31.6)

**Red**: statistically significant with 95% confidence

Project: model fitness for election data

# Recent progress

- Generalized RUM [APX UAI-13]
  - Learn the relationship between **agent features** and **alternative features**
- Preference elicitation based on experimental design [APX UAI-13]
  - c.f. active learning
- Faster algorithms [ACPX NIPS-13]
  - Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)

# Next class: Guest lecture

- Random sample elections
  - Richard Carback and David Chaum (remote)
- You need to
  - read the paper
  - prepare questions