

CSCI-4150: Introduction to Artificial Intelligence




26 March 2018

Borda Rule


$$P = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left[\text{Obama} > \text{Romney} > \text{McCain} \right] \times 4, \quad \left[\text{McCain} > \text{Romney} > \text{Obama} \right] \times 3 \\ \left[\text{Romney} > \text{Obama} > \text{McCain} \right] \times 2, \quad \left[\text{McCain} > \text{Obama} > \text{Romney} \right] \times 2 \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\text{Borda}(P) = \text{Obama}$$

Borda scores

	:	$2 \times 4 + 4 = 12$		:	$2 \times 2 + 7 = 11$		:	$2 \times 5 = 10$
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Positional Scoring Rules



Borda




Plurality
(1-approval)




Veto
(2-approval)



Plurality with Runoff



- Round 1:  drops out

- Round 2:  defeats 



Different outcome from Plurality!

Single Transferable Vote



In each round,

The alternative with the **lowest** plurality score drops out,
and is **removed** from all votes




<i>a > b > c > d</i>	<i>d > a > b > c</i>	<i>c > d > a > b</i>	<i>b > c > d > a</i>
10	7	6	3




Weighted Majority Graph (WMG)



Copeland Rule



Which axioms? Which voting rule?

 An iceberg floating in the ocean, with only a small portion visible above the water surface, symbolizing hidden or less obvious aspects of a voting rule.	Condorcet criterion	Consistency	Anonymity/neutrality, non-dictatorship, monotonicity
Plurality	N	Y	Y
STV (alternative vote)	Y	N	Y

Some Axioms Are Incompatible with Others




Theorem. For voting rules that select a single winner, anonymity is not compatible with neutrality.

Proof.

Alice



Bob



W.L.O.G.



≠



Anonymity

Neutrality

Positional Scoring Rules And Condorcet Consistency


Theorem. No positional scoring rule satisfies Condorcet consistency

Suppose $s_1 > s_2 > s_3$ (scoring vector)

3 Voters



2 Voters



1 Voter



1 Voter



is the Condorcet winner

CONTRADICTION

$3s_1 + 2s_2 + 2s_3$

$3s_1 + 3s_2 + 1s_3$

^

That's a Lot!

Now try a slightly larger tip of the iceberg at
[wiki](#), [wiki](#)

Wrap Up

- Voting rules
 - positional scoring rules
 - multi-round elimination rules
 - WMG-based rules
- Criteria (axioms) for “good” rules
 - Fairness axioms
 - Other axioms
- Evaluation
 - Impossibility theorems
 - Axiomatic characterization