Computational social choice is a rapidly growing discipline at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. It is concerned with the application of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms, and with the integration of social choice paradigms into computing (Read more).
The Seventh International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2018) will take place on June 25–27, 2018, in Troy, NY, USA. It will be hosted by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI). The aim of the workshop is to bring together different communities: computer scientists interested in computational issues in social choice; people working in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems who are using ideas from social choice to organize societies of artificial software agents; logicians interested in the logic-based specification and analysis of social procedures; computer science theorists analyzing algorithmic properties of social phenomena; and last but not least people coming from social choice theory itself: economists, mathematicians, and political scientists.
Registration is open, see here. Early registration until June 1.
Accepted papers are updated, camera ready due: April 30, 2018
Poster submission deadline April 30, 2018. To submit, please sent the title and abstract of the poster (up to 250 words) by email to firstname.lastname@example.org, with the subject "COMSOC-18 poster submission",
COMSOC-2018 will include a open poster session. Posters will be selected based on abstracts. Unlike regular submissions, they will not be reviewed by the program committee. Posters will be selected based on abstracts of up to 250 words, which can be sent by email to email@example.com, with the subject "COMSOC-18 poster submission", anytime until April 30, 2018.
The camera-ready version of accepted papers can be uploaded on the Easychair submission webpage, following the same requirements for submission as detailed below.
Regular papers should not exceed 12 pages in length, excluding references, contact information and a clearly-marked appendix of arbitrary length that will be read at the discretion of the PC members. When preparing your submission, please follow these formatting instructions. The easiest way of doing so is to use the Latex typesetting system with the class file comsoc2018.cls. The formatting instructions are based on a sample file (comsoc18.tex), which you can use as a starting point for your own paper.
You will be able to revise your submission any number of times before the deadline (March 1st, anywhere in the world).
All submitted papers will be reviewed by the program committee. Accepted papers will be collected in informal workshop notes that will not be printed. To accomodate the publishing needs of different scientific communities, we stress that authors will retain the copyright of their papers and that submitting to COMSOC-2018 does not preclude publication of the same material in a journal or in a conference with formal proceedings.
Submission of regular papers is restricted by the rule that a single person can present at most one paper at the workshop.
Troy, NY, USA, June 25--27, 2018
Computational social choice is a rapidly growing discipline at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. It is concerned with the application of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms, and with the integration of social choice paradigms into computing. The aim of the workshop is to bring together different communities: computer scientists interested in computational issues in social choice; people working in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems who are using ideas from social choice to organize societies of artificial software agents; logicians interested in the logic-based specification and analysis of social procedures; and last but not least, researchers coming from social choice theory itself: economists, mathematicians and computer scientists.
Submissions of papers describing original, under review, or recently published work on all aspects of computational social choice are invited. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to computational issues that arise in the analysis of
Preference representation languages
Restricted preference domains
manipulation, control and bribery
voting equilibria and dynamics
Fair division and allocation
Matching and coalition formation
Opinion diffusion and aggregation on social networks
Software for collective decision-making
We welcome both theoretical and empirical work on these topics, including, in particular, research on algorithms (exact, approximate, parameterized, online and distributed), learning, logic, uncertainty and simulations in the context of social choice.
Papers will have to be submitted electronically via Easychair. All submitted papers will be reviewed by the program committee. Accepted papers will be collected in informal workshop notes; however, the workshop has no formal proceedings and the authors retain their copyright. Each accepted paper will have to be presented by one of the authors, with the constraint that each workshop participant gives at most one talk (exceptions can be made due to unforeseen circumstances).
COMSOC-2018 will also include a poster session. Posters will be selected based on abstracts. Unlike regular submissions, they will not be reviewed by the program committee; the intention is to accept all posters that fall within the scope of the workshop subject to space constraints. Posters will be selected based on abstracts of up to 250 words, which can be sent by email to firstname.lastname@example.org, with the subject "COMSOC-18 poster submission", anytime until April 30, 2018.
Please contact either one of the program chairs in case of any questions:
Edith Elkind (email@example.com)
Lirong Xia (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Paper submission deadline: March 1, 2018
Notification of authors: April 4, 2018
Poster submission deadline: April 30, 2018
Camera ready due: April 30, 2018
Workshop dates: June 25-27, 2018
Abstract. YouTube competes with Hollywood as an entertainment channel, and also supplements Hollywood by acting as a distribution mechanism. Twitter has a similar relationship to news media, and Coursera to Universities. But there are no online alternatives for making democratic decisions at large scale as a society. In this talk, we will describe some algorithmic and market-inspired approaches towards large scale decision making that we are exploring. In particular, we will describe three recent results:
(1) We will show how a series of incremental votes can lead to an optimum solution to many budgeting problems. The incremental voting algorithms are inspired by prediction markets, where each subsequent participant provides a small correction to the market.
(2) We will describe how one can construct a market for public-decision-making inspired by the celebrated work of Foley and others on public good markets.
3) We will describe a deliberation mechanism where a group comes to a decision by a series of pairwise negotiations. We will show that this results in provably good decisions on median spaces.
The above results are in increasing order of interaction among decision makers -- in the first, individuals are reacting to an entire decision made by the rest of the society; in the second, individuals are participants in a market that looks very much like a traditional Fisher market, and in the third, participants interact with other participants directly as opposed to via aggregated prices.
This represents joint work with Brandon Fain, Nikhil Garg, Vijay Kamble, David Marn, Kamesh Munagala, Benjamin Plaut, and Sukolsak Sakshuwong.
Bio. Ashish Goel is a Professor of Management Science and Engineering and (by courtesy) Computer Science at Stanford University, and a member of Stanford's Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering. He received his PhD in Computer Science from Stanford in 1999, and was an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of Southern California from 1999 to 2002. His research interests lie in the design, analysis, and applications of algorithms; current application areas of interest include social networks, participatory democracy, Internet commerce, and large scale data processing. Professor Goel is a recipient of an Alfred P. Sloan faculty fellowship (2004-06), a Terman faculty fellowship from Stanford, an NSF Career Award (2002-07), and a Rajeev Motwani mentorship award (2010). He was a co-author on the paper that won the best paper award at WWW 2009, an Edelman Laureate in 2014, and a co-winner of the SigEcom Test of Time Award in 2018. Professor Goel was a research fellow and technical advisor at Twitter, Inc. from July 2009 to Aug 2014.
Abstract. In a new book with Eric Posner, Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society, we argue that markets can be a radically egalitarian and emancipatory force, but only if they are freed from the shackles of conventional institutions such as private property, which is inherently monopolistic, and one-person-one-vote, which prevents market trade. In this talk I will present the basic paradigm of Radical Markets with a focus on Quadratic Voting (QV), an efficient market alternatives to one-person-one-vote, and the ways we have tried to operationalize it in practice. I will also highlight a range of open computational social choice problems around QV. Overall, my message is that by thinking bigger and bolder, computational social choice can be a force for social transformation and contribute importantly to the solution of our most pressing social crises: rising inequality, stagnating economies and increasing political tensions.
Bio. E. (Eric) Glen Weyl is a Principal Researcher at Microsoft Research New York City and a Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University’s economics department. His work combines insights from economics, law, philosophy, computer science, political science, history and sociology radically expand the scope of market institutions so as to increase broadly shared prosperity and resolve social conflicts. His recent book with his most common collaborator, Eric Posner, Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society ties together much of his work on these themes. He also works to put these ideas into practice through working with policymakers and through entrepreneurship, including his start-up Collective Decision Engines commercializing a Pareto-efficient voting technique he invented, Quadratic Voting.
Monday, June 25
Session 1: Invited talk
|Invited talk: David Chaum|
Session 2: Fair allocation
Chair: Ioannis Caragiannis
|Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi, Vincent Conitzer and Benjamin C Lee. Dynamic proportional sharing: A game-theoretic approach|
|Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis. Comparing approximate relaxations of envy-freeness|
|Erel Segal-Halevi and Warut Suksompong. Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods|
Session 3: Manipulation and control
Chair: Joerg Rothe
|Sebastian Frederik Schneckenburger and Justin Kruger. Fall if it lifts your teammate: a novel type of candidate manipulation|
|Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra, Alexander Hoover and David Narvaez. Very hard electoral control problems|
|Zack Fitzsimmons and Edith Hemaspaandra. High-multiplicity election problems|
|12:40-14:10||Lunch (Russel Sage Dinning Hall)|
Session 4: Empirical analysis
|Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Xuan-Vinh Ho, Jakub Sliwinski and Yair Zick. The assignment problem with diversity constraints with an application to ethnic integration in public housing|
|Nicholas Mattei, Abdallah Saffidine and Toby Walsh. An axiomatic and empirical analysis of mechanisms for online organ matching|
|Manel Ayadi, Nahla Ben Amor and Jérôme Lang. The communication burden of single transferable vote, in practice|
|Allan Borodin, Omer Lev, Nisarg Shah and Tyrone Strangway. Big city vs. the great outdoors: voter distribution and how it affects gerrymandering|
|Gal Cohensius, Omer Ben Porat, Reshef Meir and Ofra Amir. Efficient crowdsourcing via proxy voting|
|15:50 - 17:30||Coffee and poster session|
Tuesday, June 26
Session 6: Invited talk
|Ashish Goel: Decision Making at Scale: Algorithms and Markets|
Session 7: Matching
Chair: Nick Mattei
|Elliot Anshelevich and Wennan Zhu. Tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching|
|Vijay Menon and Kate Larson. Robust and approximately stable marriages under partial information|
|Aleksei Kondratev and Alexander Nesterov. Random paths to popularity In two-sided matching|
Session 8: Graph-theoretic approaches
Chair: Elliot Anshelevich
|Christian Saile and Warut Suksompong. Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments|
|Dorothea Baumeister, Daniel Neugebauer, Jörg Rothe and Hilmar Schadrack. Complexity of verification in incomplete argumentation frameworks|
|Sirin Botan, Umberto Grandi and Laurent Perrussel. Multi-issue opinion diffusion under constraints|
|12:40-14:10||Lunch (Russel Sage Dinning Hall)|
Session 9: Multiwinner elections
Chair: Reshef Meir
|Piotr Faliszewski, Stanisław Szufa and Nimrod Talmon . Optimization-based voting rule design: the closer to utopia the better|
|Martin Lackner and Piotr Skowron. A quantitative analysis of multi-winner rules|
|Dominik Peters. Proportionality and strategyproofness in multiwinner elections|
|Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi, Martin Lackner and Piotr Skowron. Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints|
Session 10: Cooperative games
Chair: Bill Zwicker
|Andreas Darmann, Janosch Döcker, Britta Dorn, Jérôme Lang and Sebastian Frederik Schneckenburger. Simplified group activity selection|
|Jakub Sliwinski, Yair Zick and Ayumi Igarashi. Statistically stable communities with limited interactions|
|Akihiro Kawana and Tomomi Matsui. Trading transforms of non-weighted simple games and integer weights of weighted simple games|
|Moshe Mash, Yoram Bachrach, Kobi Gal and Yair Zick. How to form winning coalitions in mixed human-computer settings|
|19:00-||Banquet (Russel Sage Dinning Hall)|
Wednesday, June 27
Session 11: Invited talk
|Glen Weyl: Radical Markets and Quadratic Voting|
Session 12: Axiomatic analysis
Chair: Piotr Faliszewski
|Stéphane Airiau, Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Justin Kruger and Jérôme Lang. Positional social decision schemes: fair and efficient portioning|
|Zoi Terzopoulou, Ulle Endriss and Ronald de Haan. Aggregating incomplete judgments: axiomatisations for scoring rules|
|Felix Brandt, Chrisitan Saile and Christian Stricker. Voting with ties: strong impossibilities via SAT solving|
|Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir and David C. Parkes. Social choice with non quasi-linear utilities|
|11:50-13:20||Lunch (Russel Sage Dinning Hall)|
|13:20-14:20||Rump session. Chair: Umberto Grandi|
Session 13: Further topics
Chair: Vincent Conitzer
|Omer Lev, Reshe|